Why do some non-whites admire Hitler?

Civil courage and forms of resistance

Thank you very much for the welcome and even more for having the honor of being able to take over this year's commemorative lecture in memory of the White Rose. It is a highly recognized custom that the Ludwig Maximilians University in Munich keeps the memory of the White Rose alive every year, not least for the various generations of students

In 1942 a small group of students from Munich distributed "The White Rose" leaflets against Hitler and National Socialism. The medical students Alexander Schmorell and Hans Scholl formed the core of this group, Christoph Probst, Sophie Scholl, Willi Graf and Prof. Kurt Huber took part gradually active in the actions in various ways, including other members of the Freundeskreis who were not active but were involved through their knowledge.

Even if it was a small group, in addition to the men of July 20, 1944, the White Rose also made the German resistance known abroad. Thomas Mann recognized the courageous deeds in July 1943 on the BBC. The English dropped several thousand leaflets over Germany. The call of the fifth leaflet "Support the resistance movement, distribute the leaflets" did not go unheard. From the beginning the courage is admirable. Thus it says "Nothing is more unworthy of a cultured people than to rule without resistance by an irresponsible and dark instincts ruling clique to let .... If everyone waits for the other to begin, the messengers of the avenging nemesis will inexorably move closer and closer, then the last sacrifice will also be senselessly thrown into the jaws of the insatiable demon A member of Christian and Western culture consciously defend himself in this last hour, work as much as he can against the hostage of humanity, against fascism and every system of the absolute state similar to it, offer passive resistance - resistance - wherever you are. Stop this atheistic war machine from running again before it's too late the last cities are a heap of rubble, like Cologne, and before the last youth of the people bleed to death somewhere for the hubris of a subhuman. Do not forget that every people deserves the government that it endures. "[1] There is hardly a clear word about the persecution of the Jews among the resistance fighters, yes Hannah Arendt pointed out that only the White Rose publicly publicized the systematic murder of Jews has clearly named and condemned: “We do not want to write about the Jewish question in this paper, we do not want to write a defense speech - no, only as an example we want to briefly mention the fact that three hundred thousand Jews have lived in this country since the conquest of Poland Here we see the most terrible crime against the dignity of man, a crime that cannot be matched by anything like it in all of human history. "[2]

It is well known that the White Rose leaflets become more insistent and political over time: "Many, perhaps most of the readers of these leaflets, are unsure of how to oppose them. They see no possibilities. We want to try to get them to show that everyone is able to contribute to the overthrow of this system. Not through individualistic opposition, in the manner of bitter recluses, will it be possible to make the ground ripe for the overthrow of this government or even the overthrow as soon as possible to bring about, but only through the cooperation of many convinced, energetic people, people who agree on the means by which they can achieve their goal.We do not have a wide range of such means, only one always available to us - passive resistance. "[3]

It is good if we envision the voice of the "White Rose" anew, but it is also necessary to consider how we can bring the spirit of this resistance group to life today and in our situation and try to realize it in changed circumstances.

After looking through the previous memory lectures and their topics as well as some personal considerations, I have chosen moral courage as such a concrete form. A few years ago, the word still seemed relatively foreign to many. For example, Hilde Domin headed her essay on the topic from 1985 "Civil courage - a foreign word". [4] In French there is "Courage civil", which means the individual's courage to judge themselves. In the French language, however, there is also the expression "courage civique", which emphasizes purely civic courage. Both types of courage are combined in our German word civil courage. So far, the information has been that the word was first used in 1835 in The sixth edition of the famous dictionary of the French academy occurs, while it is still missing in the fifth edition from 1813. [5] The first German to use the word moral courage for the first time according to previous investigations is apparently the young Bismarck in 1847. When he was whistled and laughed at in a debate in the Prussian state parliament, he argued with an older relative over lunch over the question of whether he had to express his opinion so clearly and drastically in parliament nothing like that. ' To this Otto von Bismarck replied: 'Courage on the battlefield is common property with us; but you will not infrequently find that very respectable people lack moral courage.' "[6]

This gives an important indication of why this term exists and why it can certainly be linked to a great European tradition. Because for a long time the word bravery has stood for the larger context of meaning. However, it is unmistakable that, at least in the 20th century, people are more and more shy of approximating the word moral courage too closely to the concept of bravery. This has many reasons. One sees the concept of bravery too restricted to the military field. Indeed, valor has been recognized as a military virtue very often in recent history. Sometimes the term bravery has also been interpreted as recklessness or directly as a willingness to die. From this point of view it is understandable that more recent attempts to define the word moral courage in more detail are often made by first separating it from this conventional concept of bravery. Understandably, this happens all the more, the closer the authors are to the undeniable abuse of "bravery", especially during World War II. [7]

It is not uncommon for the word bravery to be avoided altogether and, for example, the word "courage" is used for it. [8] Despite some misuse, one should not simply be over with this word that quickly. It already occurs in pre-Christian Greek ethics , especially with Plato and Aristotle (Greek: "andreia politike", Latin: "fortitudo civilis"). Bravery is at an early age in danger of being understood primarily as a virtue of the soldier has been abused, and men have often been sent to a pointless death with reference to their necessary bravery, the word "bravery" encountered concerns and limits, especially in modern times.

In this context one should not forget that bravery in the sense mentioned was one of the cardinal virtues from ancient times. The list almost always begins with cleverness, closely connected with bravery. [9] Even with Plato, bravery is one of the four cardinal virtues. [10] The actions of the brave aim to strike a balance between cowardice and recklessness. [11] Here the relation to fear is particularly important. Sometimes you have to be afraid, e.g. to do shameful things, some things you don't have to fear at all. Above all, one is brave when it comes to the “noble death in war.” Aristotle is ultimately quite precise: “Anyone who endures and fears what one should and why one should do it and how and when, and whoever is confident in the same way, is brave. "[12] Aristotle already says that cases in which bravery is spoken of must be assessed critically. [13] Incidentally, a state must also be brave, namely as a prerequisite for peace and leisure. "But whoever cannot bravely withstand dangers is a slave to the one who attacks him." [14]

The classic European tradition, which is particularly concentrated in Thomas Aquinas, has adopted this in a wide range. I will quote a few sentences from the writings of Aquinas, who have been interpreted impressively by Josef Pieper in particular: “The praise of bravery depends, in a certain sense, on justice. That is why Ambrose says: 'Valor without righteousness is a lever of evil.' "" Those who do brave things for the sake of honor are not really brave. " "Bravery works in two ways: in attack and in standing." "The more important work of bravery, more especially than attacking, is standing, that is: standing immovable in danger." "It is harder to stand up than to attack." "He who is brave is also patient." “Patience is included in bravery. For what is inherent in the patient, not to be confused by threatening evils, that is also possessed by the brave. "" But he adds one more thing, namely that if he has to, he will deal with the threatening evils. "[15 ] These few texts alone show that the comprehensive meaning of the classical word of bravery must not be limited to soldiery behavior. Bravery proves itself both in patient acceptance of the unchangeable as well as in active engagement for moral goals of all kinds. In this process, bravery is not infrequently realized also and especially in dealing with suffering and suffering.

At this point, of course, as already introduced above, the word moral courage must be further developed. In contrast to an often too steep exaggeration of the word bravery, "civil courage" deliberately moves away from all heroic courage to death and is used with considerably less pathos for the use of one's own opinion and behavior that is not self-evident in everyday social practice Civil courage in this sense can be linked to the risk of economic and social disadvantages for representing what has been correctly recognized.

The loan word moral courage, which comes from French usage, did not immediately become familiar in the German language. In the literature of the 70s and early 80s, some, such as the already mentioned H. Domin, see it as a foreign word. In the meantime, this has changed radically. This can be seen particularly in the exuberant and inflationary citation of the term in very different types of publications, from feature pages to science. This does not, however, prove that the word has taken on a greater and deeper meaning and has really become a recognized modern virtue.

After 1968 the keyword "civil disobedience" has been used a lot and has practically absorbed individual elements of the meaning of bravery and suppressed this word even more Disobedience can be justified or even required. Civil disobedience is a non-compliance with state laws or orders, which takes place within the framework of a relatively just order for the sake of moral motives; acts of civil disobedience are of a symbolic nature, are nonviolent in nature and are carried out publicly; whoever they are Acts of civil disobedience is ready to accept their legal consequences. "[17] I do not need to go into the levels of civil disobedience or the criteria, the objections and an assessment here. [18] However, it is obvious that the concept of civil disobedience has lost its innocence, as if it were the expression of a tested conscience and a mature democracy, and above all that it does not violate the rule of law, and is therefore used much less frequently today. In this disenchantment, the term moral courage has undoubtedly acquired a greater, more comprehensive meaning.

The end of the Second World War and the post-war situation certainly gave a boost to the concept of moral courage and promoted it, reflecting what had happened especially since 1933. You can see this especially in some important testimonials. For example, D. Bonhoeffer in “Resistance and Surrender” [19] said that the word was hardly used in Germany. “What is actually behind the complaint about the lack of civil courage? We have had a lot of bravery and sacrifice in these years, but Almost nowhere found civil courage, not even with ourselves ... We Germans have had to learn the necessity and the power of obedience in a long history ... Our eyes were directed upwards. "[20] The German lacks the basic knowledge of the “Necessity of free, responsible action, also against work and mandate. They were replaced by irresponsible unscrupulousness on the one hand, and self-tormenting scruples on the other, which never led to action. Civil courage, however, can only grow out of the free responsibility of the free man. "[21] The philosopher K. Löwith expressed himself in a similar sense, who was of the opinion that there was no civil courage at all in Hitler's Germany. [22] It remains to be seen whether this word does justice to many courageous people, but I understand the great disappointment of those who had to leave their homeland.

That is why, after 1945, moral courage is intensely admonished and demanded. This creates an abundance of titles and comments that often make moral courage a central civil qualification. The Jesuit M. Pribilla said in 1957: “Military bravery must take a back seat to so-called civil courage, namely the characteristic courage to assert the truth and the right upwardly or against a misguided crowd with the commitment of one's own person and to defend. "[23] One discovers a close connection between moral courage and democracy. [24] R. Schröder [25] criticizes the later narrowing down of civil disobedience and sees it as a decline in real moral courage rather than a" revolt of the dropouts " and as a "desperate search for the last taboo that can still be broken". [26] From there, the concept of moral courage must also be brought back to its original meaning. O. Marquard writes: "Not every x- any rebelliousness civil courage. You need it at all not only for the no, but also and especially for the yes. I mean: civil courage is above all courage, civil - i.e. a civis, a polites, a citizen - to be; or in short: civil courage is the courage to be bourgeois. "[27]

This 1993 review by O. Marquard is quite harsh. He sees this belated disobedience as an attempt at relief: “as the great escape from conscience to conscience”. You no longer need to have a bad conscience yourself, you become a bad conscience for others, “so that you become less and less of yourself but more and more of the others to have this bad conscience.That is the relief arrangement I mean here: the escape from the conscience that you have yourself, into the conscience that you are for others and no longer One escapes the tribunal by becoming one, and one becomes the tribunal by calling into question all existing conditions - especially the closest ones: that is, above all also the Federal Republic - by denying their bourgeoisie. "[28]

Certainly, moral courage is related to the citizen and civil society in terms of the word. [29] This certainly means the free, self-responsible citizen. For the time being, however, let us leave aside the question of the "bourgeoisie of civil courage", which can probably be justified from pre-Christian antiquity. [30] For us today, the concept of the bourgeoisie also has its limits. openly representing divergent views as an individual or in the exercise of an office and risking conflicts or even disadvantages in return - and this vis-à-vis superiors, powerful, well-established prejudices or current fashionable points of view and also in the face of public opinion. Civil courage is the opposite of convenience, Servility, conformism, opportunism and hypocrisy.Civil courage can therefore also find very different expressions, starting with a mere contradiction against another opinion, through questioning a claim and provocation, to various forms of resistance. [31]

There is undoubtedly a close connection between civil courage and bourgeoisie in modern times. Because only when an underage subject turns into an informed citizen who can also enforce basic rights does the term take on its shape. It is a real guardian against encroachments of power. The necessary independence in judging and the power to assert oneself can be strengthened by respecting the conscience of the other, allowing criticism, encouraging self-responsibility, promoting education and information as well as an open communicative exchange. This seems to be one of the reasons why moral courage is primarily understood as an honor for the intellectual elite, which I consider to be questionable, because true bravery does not simply depend on the level of information and education alone. There are many simple people who have more moral courage and bravery than the so-called intellectuals.

Against this background, it is more than understandable that the rehabilitation of the classical doctrine of virtue in today's thinking always comes back to the virtue of bravery or just the rightly understood moral courage. In this sense, bravery also becomes a basic virtue of citizenship and life in a civil society. American communitarianism in particular has shown this impressively in recent years. [32] I will forego the discussion on the legitimation of nonviolent resistance or civil disobedience, as I briefly mentioned above. There are other forms of bravery such as loyalty to a friend. Bertolt Brecht drew our attention to these connections in a different way in his play "Mother Courage". In Brecht, the courage of a drumming deaf and mute is sung, who awakens a city to resistance at mortal danger Using forces is what is meant here. [33]


I would now like to take the liberty of looking at the biblical justification for what we call moral courage. The members of the White Rose, as can be seen from the introductory testimony, have clearly acknowledged their origins in the Christian faith and their ecclesiastical socialization. Responsibility was deeply rooted in their conscience, although I am not following the different church traditions and certainly not misunderstanding the differences between the individual members [34], especially with regard to the spiritual figure of Prof. Dr. Kurt Huber. [35]

I do not need to explain in more detail how closely the presented classical view corresponds to many statements in the Bible, both in the Old and in the New Testament. After all, the believer is also required to be fearless and resistant to evil. He shouldn't adapt to what is. The words of "the salt of the earth" and "the light of the world" say nothing else. [36] In all clarity, despite all loyalty to a just state, Christians are required to: "One must obey God more than men." [37] That is why one must also be frank in public to proclaim God's righteousness and to accept free speech risk ("parrhesia"). [38] It is always assumed that the fearlessness of the appropriate courage in this world always has the prerequisite for original hearing, obedience to the word of God. That is why this willingness is also recognized and praised, for example: "Truly, obedience is better than sacrifice, listening is better than the fat of rams" (1 Sam 15:22).

But I do not want to collect here the scattered testimonies in the Bible of the Old and New Testaments that indicate moral courage. Otherwise the long history of the right to resist would have to be discussed in great detail. [39] However, in the sense of a biblical justification, I would like to choose a weighty, but overall far too little considered group of words.

"Parrhesia" is a word that is found over 30 times in the New Testament, more frequently in the Johannine Scriptures, in the Acts of the Apostles, in Hebrews and in a few places in Paul. We usually translate it as openness, boldness, confidence, occasionally also the public. But none of these words can really convince, most likely frankness. The word comes from "pan" and "resis", so it literally has the meaning: to be able to say everything, to be able to say everything also the verb gladly translated: speak openly / freely, gain courage.

In the Greek area, the phrase is found mainly among political authors. This denotes the "freedom of speech" of the free citizens in Attic democracy. Of course, it is largely an aristocratic ideal because this freedom only applies between equals and cannot be used by slaves and newcomers, for example (cf. Acts 4:29) If someone takes such a right against this norm, it is understood as “insolence” and “boldness.” This also becomes a moral term: “parrhesia, together with eleutheria, is the highest good of the thinker and is moral A stable person who lives in full 'openness' to fellow citizens, friends and enemies, praises them but also criticizes them severely. "[40] Parrhesia is - simply but literally - the right to say everything. The slave is distinguished from the "free" precisely in that he lacks parrhesia, frankness. It turns against every tyrant, even against the people (demos) when they become tyrannical specific speech, its relationship to truth is important. Freedom (parrhesia), freedom (eleutheria) and truth (aletheia) belong together and are always visible in their connection. For the Greeks, sincerity always means law (exousia) There is sincerity not only in public challenges, but also among friends, provided they are really free. Where there is no parrhesia, this is based on a wrong education. In Greek philosophy, the parrhesia is then more and more morally qualified and elevated It is revealing that parrhesia is something worth striving for in very different philosophical schools, for example in the Epicurean and Cynic directions.

It is astonishing that in the transfer of parrhesia from the political to the moral sphere, the character of the public has not been lost. "For the Greeks, the concept of parrhesia is always associated with the idea of ​​the public and a public way of life." [41] A reference to freedom is also preserved in the moral meaning: only he can have parrhesia in the moral world who does not benefit from slave passions, but is really free. That is why one always has to fight for sincerity. "When all people have parrhesia, the concept of parrhesia is canceled out." [42]

It is very revealing that this parrhesia can also be found in Jewish-Hellenistic literature. Almost all structural elements that we have mentioned are also present here, not least the connection between boldness, freedom, truth and justice. This also applies to the Septuagint, the Greek translation of the Old Testament. However, a new usage of language is also recognizable. “We find the word parrhesia used here in relation to God. This is something new compared to the older Greek usage. "[43] It is noticeable that in this new usage a slave may also have the right to boldness. In any case, a slave of God has a right to parrhesia, if he has freed himself from sins and wrongdoing. Philo is convinced that the slave only gets worse if the master does not grant him boldness. In this context the concept of parrhesia is linked with the idea of ​​"syneidesis", that is, with conscience and the examination of conscience. This becomes clear in Josephus and Philo. [44] The idea that the slave of God has a right to parrhesia is not found in Hellenistic literature so far, but in the Judeo-Greek interpretation of the Bible. This parrhesia vis-à-vis God, the right to “say everything” to God, is expressed in prayer. This is illustrated above all in Abraham and Moses. “Not everyone has parrhesia vis-à-vis God, but only the excellent figures of Jewish history have parrhesia, they who stand out from the great crowd ... and who have an exemplary meaning for the consciousness of the believing Jew as a 'prayer'. "[45] The prayer has as a" friend "of God - here strikes again all the weight of the doctrine of friendship - only the right to say everything to God.

It is a sign of the deep history of meaning of the word parrhesia that the New Testament usage is to be understood from the perspective of Hellenism and Greek-speaking Judaism. An example of this comes from Paul's letter to Philemon: "Although in Christ I have full freedom (parrhesia) to command you what you are to do, I prefer to ask you for love's sake," writes old Paul in chains to Philemon and stands up for his slave Onesimus. (8) The connection between public and frankness is also evident, as emerges from the Johannine scriptures, cf. e.g. Jn 7: 4. Sometimes the public is also opposed to the divine mystery (cf. (Eph 6:19; 3:12) “In Christ we have the right to say everything to God, and we have access. [46] Originally, God is the sovereign Lord of judgment, to whom one cannot actually approach Jesus Christ can and we may have the courage to approach him (cf. 1 John 2:28; 4:17; 3:21; 5:14). Everything we ask will be heard by God in his own way God does not refuse anything to friends who have the right to free speech of the truth, and will calm our hearts in his presence. Because even if the heart condemns us - God is bigger than our heart and he knows everything. Dear brothers, if the heart does not judge us, we have confidence in God (parrhesia); everything we ask, we receive from him because we keep his commandments and do what he pleases. "(1 Jn 3: 19ff.) Here, too, the structure shown above is shown again: only if we follow the instructions and commandments of God if we follow, we obtain all that we ask for because of the parrhesia.

It is not by chance that the gaze falls mainly on the believer, who holds on to God in faithfulness and loses his life for it. “When we survey the testimonies of the ancient Church, we see that the martyr was primarily thought of as being in possession of the parrhesia. The martyr has twofold parrhesia: one on earth and one in heaven. On earth he proves his parrhesia against the authorities hostile to faith. After his death, however, he has parrhesia with God, because he is already in paradise and as a 'friend of God' can now ask him for everything. The martyr does that too; he prays for the living and so the word parrhesia in the Greek Church becomes a central concept in the teaching and intercession of martyrs, and then of saints in general. "[47] Erik Peterson and Heinrich Schlier bring many testimonies from the old one Church, which attest to the intense survival of these convictions.The parrhesia is necessary in order to prove the invocation of the martyr to be justified, and it is in this that the intercession of the martyrs and of the saints is founded.

The parrhesia gives the martyr and the saint the right to say everything to God for the benefit of sinners and to ask him for everything. But parrhesia can only be had when the soul is purified and can stand before God. Incidentally, the whole problem becomes particularly acute when the Our Father is praying. The parrhesia is necessary because we call God "Father" in this prayer. This is a "risk" (tolman). "If every prayer requires parrhesia, so that in the St. James' liturgy the priest asks God for parrhesia during the offertory prayer ... how much more the prayer of the Our Father and so the sentence introducing the Our Father in the Roman Mass is based on these same assumptions to be understood: Praeceptis salutaribus moniti, et divina institutione formati, audemus dicere: Pater noster etc. The audemus dicere ... is an expression of the parrhesia of the believers. "[48] This gains an additional closeness through the Lord's Prayer in the Eucharistic celebration, whereupon it is not necessary to go into more detail here. [49] We have largely forgotten that we need this permission and the corresponding parrhesia in prayer in order to be able to "say everything" to God, but it remains a valuable insight for today. [50] I can no longer follow in more detail here that the Latin translation of parrhesia "fiducia" hides and displaces many motifs and elements of the original idea of ​​parrhesia, so that the decisive content of the classic parrhesia idea could only partially reach the later European cultural heritage. [51]

It is astonishing how in this thought of boldness Greek thought and the spirit of Greek-speaking Judaism, but also of the New Testament and the early Church, are united and form an almost seamless unity. But this also shows the depth to which this frankness is culturally, ethically and religiously anchored. This idea fits perfectly to the members of the White Rose, who can really be called martyrs in this context and in the same sense. [52] If you read their leaflets and certificates, you will find - also in the sense of the texts cited at the beginning - many echoes of the relationships shown. This also brings the idea of ​​moral courage to a climax.

These are not only historically interesting considerations, but considerations that have become faded and useless somewhere for today. I want to show this briefly. There is an astonishing parallel for this, which has yet to be shown in this context. The French philosopher and historian Michel Foucault (1926-1984), holder of the chair for the history of systems of thought at the Collège de France in Paris, dedicated his last major lectures to parrhesia: frank, public, and occasionally rebellious speech. This keyword has become a major theme in his later work. The central issue is the courage to be truthful. It reached a particular climax in the book "The Government of the Self and the Others" [53]. This great work, which in the ten lectures is guided entirely by the idea of ​​parrhesia, opens up the largely forgotten ethical foundation of this ancient and at the same time modern virtue At the same time, Foucault formulates his philosophical testament. Of course, Foucault, even if he knows, for example, BH Schlier's contribution, remains largely with the ancient texts. M. Foucault points to two dimensions of this "complex concept" when he begins the ninth Lecture says: “on the one hand (namely) on the principle of free access for all to speech; and on the other hand on the principle of the boldness with which one says everything. Wouldn't parrhesia then all in all consist in everyone being able to say anything? That is, in a sense, suggested by the word itself. In fact, we saw ... that things were a little more complicated. First of all, because parrhesia is not the same as freedom of speech, the freedom of speech that everyone can enjoy. In fact, the parrhesia appears to be an institution, if not guaranteed by law, at least a habitual institution that is bound by the privileges of the right to speak. Second, it turns out that parrhesia is not just the freedom to say anything, but on the one hand an obligation to tell the truth and, on the other hand, an obligation that is accompanied by the danger of speaking the truth. " [54]

If one were to develop Michel Foucault's thoughts further, one could see even better how much parrhesia belongs to the theory and practice of modern democracy and how closely the idea of ​​moral courage is closely related to this word. This reveals a fundamental strand of European political, ethical and religious thought that goes beyond all historical conditions and is particularly accomplished in the exemplary life, work and death of the members of the White Rose. But we also think of courageous men and women of civil courage in our day, here in Munich especially Dominik Brunner, who paid with his life on September 12, 2009 at the S-Bahn station in Solln for his work for children and young people. Your gift of life must not be in vain.

[1] I. Scholl, The White Rose.Extended new edition, Frankfurt 1977 and others, 97 (1st leaflet, cf. also 47f.).

[2] Ibid., 102 (2nd leaflet). See also R. Herder, ways in the resistance against Hitler, Freiburg i. Br. 2009, 53f .; also H. Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem. A report on the banality of evil, new edition, Munich 1986, 138.

[3] Ibid., 107f. (3rd leaflet).

[4] The essay from 1985 is included in: Hilde Domin, Gesammelte Essays. Heimat in der Sprache, Munich 1992, 255-261 (see also 409).

[5] Ibid., 234.

[6] R. von Keudell, Prince and Princess Bismarck. Memories from the years 1846 to 1872, Berlin-Stuttgart 1901, 8; cf. also O. Marquard, Zivilcourage, in: Historical Dictionary of Philosophy, Vol. 12, Basel 2004, 1362-1365, quotation: 1363; by the same author: moral courage. In memoriam Erwin Stein, in: Ders., Skepticism and consent, Stuttgart 1994 (Reclam-Universal-Bibliothek 9334), 123-131.

[7] In addition to the above-mentioned essay by Hilde Domin, see especially I. Fetscher, encouragement to moral courage. Plea for a virtue that is neglected, in: K. Rahner / B. Welte (ed.), Courage for virtue. About the ability to live more humanly, Freiburg i. Br. 1979, 94-103; see also on the O. Marquard case, civil courage, in: Ders., Skepticism and consent. Philosophical Studies, Stuttgart 1994, 123-131 (originally 1993).

[8] E.g. R. Guardini, Tugenden, Mainz 1987, 92-102. I am foregoing other similar certificates here.

[9] On this classical doctrine of virtues see O. F. Bollnow, Wesen und Wandel der Tugenden, Frankfurt 1958 and others, 77-89; R. Guardini, Virtues: Meditation on shapes of moral life, 4th edition, Mainz 1992, 92-102; J. Pieper, writings on philosophical anthropology and ethics: Das Menschenbild der Tugendlehre, ed. von B. Wald, Hamburg 1996, 113-136 (the treatise on bravery appeared in many editions, e.g. also J. Pieper, Das Viergespann, Munich 1964, 163-198). A short description can also be found in J. Pieper, Über das christliche Menschenbild, Munich 1950 u.ö., 37-46. The proximity to the subject "Fear of the Lord" (40ff.), A subject that is closely related to the thoughts of Hans Jonas, is remarkable there. Cf. also M. Brumlik, Bildung und Glück. An attempt at a theory of virtues, Berlin 2002 , 156ff .; F. Ricken, Community, virtue, happiness. Plato and Aristotle on the good life, Stuttgart 2004; O. Höffe, Lebenskunst und Moral or Macht Tugend Glück, Munich 2007 (cf. Reg .: 388).

[10] Cf. Republica IV, 427ff.

[11] Cf. the original passages in the Nicomachean Ethics, especially III, 4,9,10; a compilation of the most important statements can be found in O. Höffe, Aristoteles-Lexikon = Kröners Taschenausgabe 459, Stuttgart 2005, 44-45 (Ph. Brüllmann).

[12] Nicomachean Ethics III, 10, 1115b 17-19.

[13] Ibid., III, 11.

[14] Ibid., VII, 15, 1334a 21f.

[15] Cf. the original texts and the locations, in: Thomas-Brevier, compiled, translated into German and introduced by J. Pieper, Munich 1956, first part: No. 366-379, pp. 158-162; J. Pieper, Lesebuch, Munich 1981, 21, 39, 83ff.

[16] Cf. on this W. Huber, Ziviler Disobedience, in: Evangelisches Soziallexikon. New edition, Stuttgart 2001, 1842-1846 (lit.).

[17] Ibid., 1843. - For an example of the theoretical development see J. Habermas, Ziviler Disobedience - Test Case for the Democratic Rule of Law, in: Ders., Die Neue Unichtlichkeit. Kleine Politische Schriften V, Frankfurt 1985, 79-99 (originally 1983); on the American variant of civil disobedience see especially H. Arendt, Ziviler Disobedience, in: Dies., At present. Political Essays, Hamburg 1986/1999, 129-159 (created 1970).

[18] On this, W. Huber, ibid., 1843-1846 (lit.).

[19] Letters and Notes from Detention, ed. by Chr. Gremmels et al. = Dietrich Bonhoeffer Werke VIII, Gütersloh 1998, 23f.

[20] Ibid., 23f.

[21] Ibid., 24.

[22] My life in Germany before and after 1933. A report, newly edited by F.-R. Hausmann, Stuttgart 1986/2007, 74.

[23] Courage and civil courage of Christians, 3rd edition, Frankfurt a.M. 1957, 57.

[24] Cf. e.g. I. Fetscher, encouragement to moral courage, in: K. Rahner / B. Welte (ed.), Courage for virtue, Freiburg i. Br. 1979, 94-103; MR. Laurien, Bravery, in: N. Kutschki (ed.), Cardinal Virtues. Old maxims of life seen again, Würzburg 1993, 31-40.

[25] Cf. R. Schröder, Zivilcourage, in: K. Fincke / J. Zehne (ed.), Confidence in theology. Academic Theology and the Renewal of the Church, Berlin 2000, 474-487, esp. 478f .; on the subject see also W. Huber, Ziviler Disobedience, 1842-1846; see also the article civil courage by A. Herrmann / G. Meyer, in: ibid., 1838-1842.

[26] Ibid., 486.

[27] Skepticism and Agreement, 123; cf. also Ders., Future Needs Origin, Stuttgart 2003, 247-260.

[28] Skepticism and Agreement, 130.

[29] On the concept of civil society see P. Nolte, Religion und Bürgergesellschaft. Do we need a religion-friendly state ?, Berlin 2009, 7ff., 57ff., 66ff., 107ff.

[30] Cf. Chr. Meier, The emergence of the political among the Greeks, Frankfurt 1980, 40f., 139f., 214ff., 289f.

[31] On these forms of resistance, also under National Socialism, see, for example, the study by H. Hürten, Persecution, Resistance and Testimony. Church under National Socialism. Questions from a historian, Mainz 1987. Cf. also by the same author the article "Resistance?", In: Ders., Deutsche Katholiken 1918-1945, Paderborn 1992, 523-541, especially the summary 541.

[32] Instead of many I only mention A. MacIntyre, The Loss of Virtue. On the moral crisis of the present, Frankfurt 1987, 165ff., 207f., 223f., 256ff., 265ff .; V. Weber, virtue ethics and communitarianism, Würzburg 2002; A. Honneth (ed.), Kommunitarismus, Frankfurt 1993.

[33] Cf. also D. Mieth, Die neue Tugenden. An ethical draft, Düsseldorf 1984, 90f .; A. W. Müller, What is virtue good for? Elements of an ethics of the good life, Stuttgart 1998; O. Höffe, economic citizen, citizen, world citizen. Political Ethics in the Age of Globalization, Munich 2004, 82ff. u.ö. The essays by J. Messner, Ethics and Society, also contain important elements. Essays 1965-1974, Cologne 1975, esp. 13ff., 31ff., 139ff. u.ö .; R. Schröder, Über den Bürgermut, in: International theological journal "Communio" 27 (1998), 411-420. Here it says: Civil courage "is the courage to defend one's convictions against expected opposition, this time from the majority. It is the opposite of leisurely or adaptive opportunism. " (411); see also H. Küng, encouragement for moral courage, in: A. Raffelt with the participation of B. Non-White (ed.), Weg und Weite. Festschrift for K. Lehmann, Freiburg i. Br. 2001, 705-710.

[34] Cf. briefly Lexicon of German Resistance, ed. by W. Benz and W. H. Pehle, Frankfurt 1994; K.-J. Hummel / Chr. Strohm (ed.), Witnesses to a Better World. Christian Martyrs of the 20th Century, Leipzig 2000; J. Mehlhausen (ed.), Witnesses of the Resistance, Tübingen 1996; R. Herder, Ways to Resistance Against Hitler, Freiburg i. Br. 2009; see for a summary A. Doering-Manteuffel / J. Mehlhausen (ed.), Christian Ethos and the Resistance to National Socialism in Europe = Konfession und Gesellschaft 9, Stuttgart 1995 (lit.), in particular J. Gauck, "Perceiving - Enduring - Resisting". Civil courage. Considerations to one difficult term in a difficult century, 155-164.

[35] See also the article by J. Knab, How Conscience Forms. The White Rose's resistance to National Socialism was an uprising of conscience. How did it come about ?, in: Christ in der Gegenwart, No. 37 (2009), 613f.

[36] Cf. Mt 5:13.

[37] Cf. Acts 5:29.

[38] Cf. Acts 4,14; 14.3; 26.26; 28.31; 2 Cor 3:12; Eph 6:19.

[39] Cf. in a nutshell O. Höffe, Resistance Law, in: Ders., Lexikon der Ethik, 7th edition, Munich 2008, 345f. (Lit.); ders., Is there a right of resistance in a democracy ?, in: Moral-political discourses, Frankfurt 1981 u.ö., 160-170.

[40] H. Balz, Art. Parrhesia, in: Exegetical dictionary for the New Testament, ed. by H. Balz and G. Schneider, Vol. III, Stuttgart 1983 and others, 105-112, quotation: 106; on the phenomenon cf. in particular the two contributions by E. Peterson, which are still irreplaceable today, on the history of meaning of Parrhesia, in: W. Koepp (ed.), Reinhold Seeberg-Festschrift, vol. 1. On the theory of Christianity, Leipzig 1929, 283 -297; and by H. Schlier, Art. parrhesia, in: Theological Dictionary for the New Testament, ed. by G. Friedrich, Vol. V, Stuttgart 1954, 869-884.

[41] E. Peterson, supra, 288.

[42] Ibid., 289.

[43] Ibid., 289, see also H. Schlier, ibid., 872ff.

[44] Cf. E. Peterson, ibid., 289ff .; H. Schlier, ibid., 873ff.

[45] E. Peterson, ibid., 290f.

[46] Ibid., 292.

[47] Ibid., 293.

[48] ​​Ibid., 296f.

[49] Cf. ibid., 297; H. Schlier, ibid., 883f.

[50] There are useful thoughts on this, especially in connection with Erik Peterson, in Thomas Michels, Die Gabe des Freimutes im Geistlichen Leben according to evidence from the liturgy, in: Ders., Sarmenta, Münster, 1972, 147-152, esp. 149f.

[51] Cf. E. Peterson, Fiducia in den Altrömischen Sakramentaren, in: Liturgisches Leben 1 (1934), 224-231; also L.J. Engels, Art. Fiducia, in: Reallexikon für Antike und Christianentum, Vol. VII, Stuttgart 1969, 839-877.

[52] Cf. especially E. Peterson, Theologische Traktate, 53-129, on this the description by A. Robben, Märtyrer. Theology of Martyrdom with Erik Peterson = studies on systematic and spiritual theology 45, Würzburg 2007, as well as the review by B. Nichtweiß, in: Theologie und Philosophie 83 (2008) 152-154. On the martyrs of the early church, see above all Th. Baumeister, The Beginnings of Theologie des Martyriums = Munster Contributions to Theology 45, Munster 1980; Martyrdom, hagiography and veneration of saints in Christian antiquity = Roman quarterly for Christian antiquity and church history, 61st Supplementary volume, Rome 2009 (further information in the bibliography Th. Baumeisters, 327-342). I cannot go into the opinion of the Protestant theology and church, to which some members of the White Rose belonged, with regard to the assessment of martyrdom, but the assessment has received a much more positive quality through the figure of D. Bonhoeffer.

[53] This lecture from 1982/83 was published in 2008 in Paris and 2009 in Frankfurt. See also the location of the lectures by F. Gros, 471-490. On Michel Foucault see H.-H.-Kögler, Michel Foucault, 2nd edition, Stuttgart, 2004 and especially on our topic S. Krasmann / M. Volkmer (ed.), Michel Foucault's "History of Governmentality" in the social sciences. International contributions, Bielefeld 2007; E. Erdmann / R. Forst / A. Honneth (ed.), Ethos der Moderne. Foucault's Critique of Enlightenment, Frankfurt 1990 Cf. also M. Foucault's central work: Hermeneutik des Subjects, Frankfurt, 2004 (also paperback edition, Frankfurt 2009), also the introduction to the lecture by F. Gros: 616-668, cf. also The Truth and the Legal Formen, Frankfurt 2003.

[54] The Government of Self and Others, 375.